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DEFENDING THE GOVERNMENT:
JUSTICE AND THE CIVIL DIVISION
BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK*

INTRODUCTION

A decade has passed since I was Assistant Attorney General in
the Department of Justice. Thinking it a ripe, round-yeared time to
reflect on my experiences, I readily agreed to join this symposium. I
began by dragging out the old files that I had planned to use for
many a scholarly article -untouched for the ten years.
As I read once more about pernicious government contractors,
treacherous client agencies and territory-grabbing officials, I recalled
the wrath beneath the bureaucratic locutions of my memos and letters: "it is with deepest regret;" "under the circumstances," and "we
have no choice but to. . .

."

Through the remembered rage, I saw

the motives of my opponents more benignly and noticed, too, that
the landscape of their arguments looked different from a distance.
I also did some reading in the literature on the office and role of
the Attorney General, much of which appears in the form of biographies and autobiographies. Here my surprise was at how cyclical the
problems are, how much their resolution depends on leadership and
character, and how little on institutions. But there is little analytical
scholarship on either the office of the Attorney General or the men
who have held it; and even less on the Department of Justice and its
lawyers.
After providing some background on the Civil Division and a
short account of my particular experience there, I address the question of the government lawyer's role. In my view, the government
lawyer plays three parts: representative of the client agency or Congress; representative of the government as a whole; and representative of the public interest. I close with an example of how attention
to process can serve to ease, though not eradicate, the occasional
conflicts in this tri-partite role.
* Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law, Stanford University. Professor Babcock was Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division from 1977-1979.
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THE CIVIL DIVISION

The Civil Division is the oldest of the litigating arms of the Department of Justice. It was established in 1868 to handle claims
against the government - which in a broad sense it still does. The
division represents the United States in its civil litigation. It has no
specialty like tax or lands and natural resources, and no program
like antitrust or civil rights. Unlike the criminal division, its primary
litigating lawyers are mostly located in Washington rather than in
the U.S. Attorneys' offices throughout the country.
The breadth of the Civil Division's responsibilities makes it easiest to describe as I just have - in terms of what it is not. ' The
Division's lack of a program or specialty, as well as its broad jurisdiction, afford it some protection from partisan political influence
and indeed, on most occasions, from much attention at all. On the
other hand, that same breadth makes the division always vulnerable
to criticism on some front and forever difficult to control.
One of my first observations about daily life in the Civil Division was that people had an air of being on to a good, but little
known, thing. No matter what the Attorney General did or how
many officials were indicted or fired, a lawyer in the Civil Division
could continue giving sound advice to clients and litigating interesting cases. "We're not a glamour division," the career attorneys told
me, but with the powerful implication that this was not a bad thing.
Nevertheless, when I arrived I sensed some lack of collective
self-esteem in the division. Only later did I realize that my arrival
might have been a contributing factor. Although the hiring practices
had changed from the times when the Assistant Attorney General
would "visit the Harvard or Yale or Columbia Law School each year
to pick out top honor men for his needs,"' the numbers of women in
the ranks were very low. The Department of Justice has always reflected the maleness of the legal profession, and historically, the
Civil Division has been headed by white men from distinguished
practices.'
1. I like the rather breathless description of the division in L. HUSTON, THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 120 (1967): "The duties and responsibilities of the Civil Division of the Department of Justice are heavy. The laws it administers are multitudinous; its activities are kaleidoscopic; its impact upon the affairs of citizens is
incalculable."
2. See F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY, 262 (1962) (Biddle was Franklin
Roosevelt's Attorney General); and Jost, The Women at Justice, 75 A.B.A. J. 54 (Aug.
1989). This latter source, subtitled "Meese was part of the problem. Is Thornburgh
the solution?", is an excellent account of the history of women in high positions in
Justice. Jost concludes that the department is still a very male institution.
3. The only woman Chief of the Civil Division before my tenure was Carla Hills,
who was Assistant Attorney for almost a year before she became Secretary at HUD in
the Ford administration. Her practice background was very much like that of her
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My background as a litigator, an administrator with experience
in Washington (albeit heading the Public Defender), a teacher and
scholar of civil procedure at Stanford, qualified me too- but it had
not been the usual route to the job. I caine to head the Civil Division because President Carter sought to appoint women to highlevel positions. When I first arrived, journalists often asked: "How
do you feel about getting your job because you are a woman." I developed a stock answer: "It's far better than not getting it because
I'm a woman." I now see that my insouciance may have been unsettling to many of the lawyers in the division.
I probably added to their distress by calling the division together soon after I took the job so that I could tell them who I was
and what I expected. I mentioned in passing that I was a feminist. I
intended this as shorthand for a view of life and used it as I would
use other applicable descriptions-a liberal, a Democrat, a
workaholic, a litigator, a procedure buff. But I could not have struck
more horror into the people I was trying to inspirit. My one word
was translated into a plan to fire all the men, hire and promote only
women, and default in defending all sex discrimination suits against
the government.
As the Civil Division and I came to know each other, however, I
realized that the low morale sprang from sources deeper than the
personality and gender of the Assistant Attorney General. The division was not suffering any shark-like attacks, but rather a steady
nibbling away of its authority; it lacked adequate resources and organization to protect its far-flung domain.
At the suggestion, and with the support of the top career lawyers, I decided to undertake a major reorganization of this old institution. One of the side benefits of this brand of reform was that it
effectively insulated me from the press. The difficulties and delights
of reorganization do not make good copy. When I told reporters my
reorganization stories, their eyes glazed over and soon they stopped
calling altogether.
Ten years later, I remember the creative pleasures of bringing
some order to the Division, making it comprehensible to the outsider, efficient for those within, and shaping it so that it could better
use and attract funds and thus resist efforts to strip it of central
litigating authority. But reorganization has no more widespread fascination now than it did then, so I will move on after offering the
barest outline of what we accomplished.
The Division had never really been organized at all, but rather
had just grown as Congress passed legislation that gave rise to new
male predecessors.
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areas of litigation. Defending or enforcing the new legislation in
court often fell to the Civil Division and a special section to handle
the work would be established with new lawyers and support staff.
The section then became a line item in the Division's budget which
seldom grew, but also could virtually never be abolished. Thus, I
found a Division with fourteen major sections and several other
mini-subdivisions-each with its own hierarchy, training and advancement program, management style and reputation. Different
sections were often doing similar work and often unwilling to share
resources or expertise.
We re-organized into three large functional programs. Although
from the beginning the reorganization seemed to work, I felt considerable unease about doing it. On the other hand, except for the few
times I argued in court for the government, I was usually uneasy as
Assistant Attorney General. Ultimately, however, two realizations
sustained me. First, I was on leave from Stanford where I had a very
good job. I did not have to worry about moving onward or upward in
this or the next administration. And both ambitions for immortality
and fear of disgrace fell away as I realized that being Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division was such an enormous responsibility that no one would ever be able to tell whether I succeeded or
failed.
I have some sense, however, that the reorganization allowed the
Civil Division's lawyers to play their multiple roles better. For this
reason, and perhaps also because it served as a diversionary tactic,
the reorganization helped slow the assault on the litigation authority
of Justice-which was also a good thing for the Civil Division. Finally, though not conclusive evidence of success, the reorganization
survives today-long after my other orders and priorities have been
remanded and superseded.
THE TRI-PARTITE ROLE

Because of my years as a public defender, I have often had to
answer the question that criminal defense lawyers always meet:
"How can you defend someone you know is guilty?"" Though no
such question dogs Civil Division lawyers, defending the government
is sometimes more difficult than defending the guilty.'
The criminal defense lawyer has little role confusion - she
4.

I summarize the answers I have developed over the years in Babcock, De-

fending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175 (1983-4).

5. There is some authorial licence involved in this title because the Civil Division enforces statutes and regulations and contracts as well as defending them, yet
even enforcement work often has an element of defending the agency's right to
regulate.
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owes unswerving duty to a single client whose interests are crystalline. Within the balance of advocacy and ethics, the client's best interest dictates all choices about what defenses to raise, what witnesses to call, and whether to go to trial. The defense lawyer takes
care of her client, and leaves the public good to the rest of the system, which is uniformly massed in opposition to her very vulnerable
client.
The government lawyer, in contrast, must play multiple roles
and serve many interests. She has an actual client, often demanding
the same total devotion as does the criminally accused client. She
also represents "the United States" as a litigant in the courts. Finally, partly because her client is great and powerful, she shculd
take explicit account of the public good in her litigation practices
and policies.'
A.

The Client Agencies

An exasperated lawyer from private practice summed up the
worst image of the government lawyer:
Without a client, favoring their roles as advocates over their roles as
advisors, uncircumscribed by the demands of time, money or available
lawyers, the government's trial attorneys press on .... 7
The Civil Division lawyers, however, almost always do have an identifiable client, and sometimes more than one: an agency whose programs are at issue in litigation; the Congress whose legislation is
under attack. Like private clients, they require soothing and handholding, expect miracles from their lawyers, and are often totally
selfish in their outlook.
Civil Division clients differ from individual and corporate clients, however, because they are captives. They can neither appear in
court on their own behalf, nor change lawyers. Central litigating authority for the government resides in the Attorney General by statute.' Naturally this is a point of stress in the relationship between
the Civil Division's lawyers and its client agencies.
The client agencies may not have litigating authority but they
6. William Simon argues persuasively that all lawyers should take into account
interests beyond those of their immediate clients, including the public interest. His
reasoning for a wider ethical responsibility for private lawyers cuts even more
strongly when the lawyer represents the government. Simon, Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
7. Pendley, No Clients, No Responsibility, THE LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 15, 1988, at
17.
8. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 515-519, 547 (1966) (reposing in the Attorney General and
his designates authority to appear in court in all cases in which the United States has
an interest); 2 U.S.C. § 118 (1875) (authorizing the Attorney General to represent
members of both houses of congress).
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do have lawyers. Every agency has a general counsel's office that
goes between its policy makers and the Department of Justice. Of
course no lawyer ever finds the work of another lawyer to be beyond
criticism. One of the letters in my files describes an appellate argument in which an agency lawyer stood up from the audience in the
midst of the Civil Division lawyer's exchange with the court and offered a different version of the point. Seldom did professional relations become that strained, but there was often dispute about expertise-and even competence-on both sides of this indissoluble
lawyer-client, client-lawyer relationship.
Agency lawyers charged that Justice Department lawyers did
not understand the programs and needs of the clients. Justice Department lawyers accused agency lawyers of narrow parochialism,
and urged that the skill of a litigator is litigation. I found myself
often arguing that litigators are better at translating the technical
concerns of the agencies to the fact-finders precisely because they
are not experts in the programs. A fresh eye, independent look, the
ability to ask and answer the basic questions -these are the skills of
the Department of Justice ("DOJ") litigator.9
Of course the theoretical arguments can break down in specific
cases-in any one of which the agency lawyer might be superior to
the DOJ attorney in litigation and other related skills. This is especially possible when new agencies are created with appropriations to
hire experienced lawyers and support them adequately-while the
Civil Division slogs on with its ever-expanding responsibilities and
incremental budget, increases.
The warfare over litigation authority never ends, however
clearly the general statutes place it in the Attorney General. Over
the years, many independent regulatory agencies have been granted
special litigating authority at their inception; other agencies have
obtained it through favorable congressional committees that carve
out an exception for them."0 Sometimes the Justice Department has
9. Another argument for Department Of Justice litigators focuses on their familiarity with jurisdictional attacks, procedural arguments such as the statute of limitations, and defenses peculiar to the government such as sovereign immunity. Repre-

sentation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 142-44 (Dec. 1975, Feb. 1976) [hereinafter 1975-76 Hearings] (answering the subcommittee's questions about the expertise the Civil Division had brought
to specified cases.)
Because I was not convinced that these arguments were always deployed consistently with the government lawyer's role as model litigator, I did not rely so much on
this type of expertise in defending DOJ's control of litigation.
10. For a list of agencies with their own litigating authority, which is still the
best compilation, see id. at 145-47. Former Attorney General Griffin Bell traces the
history of the agencies seeking their own litigating authority in his memoir, TAKING
CARE OF THE LAW, 173-78 (1982) (with Ostrow) [hereinafter MEMOIRS] and in Bell,
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contracted with agencies to divide litigating responsibility according
to types of cases. The results of these contracts are as predictable as
they are ironic: the lawyers on each side litigate with each other over
the meaning of the contract.
The chipping becomes a chopping away of the centralized litigating authority whenever the Department of Justice is weak politically-which it was at the beginning of the Carter administration.
The Justice Department was still reeling from the Watergate scandals, and in the year preceding Carter's election, the Senate Judiciary Committee had held some extraordinary hearings on who should
represent the interests of the United States in court." President
Carter had promised, moreover, to reform the Department of Justice, and was a man who generally believed in taking a fresh look at
the Department. As I learned on a small scale in the Civil Division,
however, the prospect of reorganization can temporarily undermine
an institution as uncertainty and the natural tendency to defend the
familiar system prevail.
Thus, from almost the first day, I found myself fending off restive clients who were either demanding their own litigating authority from a sympathetic Congress, or seeking the same result by contract with the Civil Division. One of their main arguments was that
the division did not give the same zealous representation that lawyers in private practice afford their clients.
This was not an ideal situation in which to urge the idea that
the government lawyer should represent interests beyond the immediate goals of the client agency. Rather, the much more appealing
response was that the Justice Department would raise every "tenable," "respectable," "reasonable" argument on behalf of a client
agency-at least at the trial level.' 2 Such a response enhances client
The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator
or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049 (1978).

11. 1975-76 Hearings, supra note 9. These hearings dealt with the possibility of
establishing a counsel to represent Congress in the courts so that many of the arguments about the role of Justice were the same as those made when an agency seeks
independent litigating authority. Assistant Attorney General Rex Lee of the Civil Division and his career deputies were the main witnesses from the Justice Department.
Although the scholarliness and integrity of Edward Levi, Attorney General in the
Ford Administration, had helped repair the Department of Justice internally, his
time in office was short and urgent matters such as re-chartering the FBI had consumed much of the time he had to restore the Department politically.
12. I have not found it written anywhere that the Department of Justice must
raise every tenable, or reasonable, or respectable argument on a client's behalf at
least at the trial level. But I heard it spoken often enough, and it is implicit in the
testimony of some of the Civil Division lawyers at the 1975-76 Hearings,supra note 9
at 81-86. See also the exchange of letters among Robert Stern (an expert in Supreme
Court procedure), Simon Lazarus (a Washington lawyer) and Robert Bork, Solicitor
General on the question whether the Justice Department was unreasonably refusing
to defend the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign statute in Buckley
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relations, removing pressure from the lawyer-client relationship, and
often improving morale so appreciably that the client is more cooperative and amenable to other advice. Taking this position also
makes the government litigator's job simpler: "tenable" arguments
are easier to discern than what is just in the circumstances.
Here is another of the paradoxes that abound in government
service. The Department of Justice has central litigating authority
in order that the government may look beyond the narrow concerns
of ordinary adversariness, be consistent in its positions, and reflect
the democratic desire for just results in court. This sometimes
means that in the name of larger goals, the government lawyer will
not raise every procedural or even substantive point in a clientagency's favor. If the Justice Department fails to raise all reasonable
arguments for an agency's programs, those arguments will not be
heard in court. What will be heard is the agency in Congress demanding its own litigating authority. Yet soon after coming to the
Justice Department, I realized that its capacity to make independent judgments in furtherance of its tri-partite role was the reason
for its centralized litigating authority. So while taking due account
of the government lawyer's obligation to represent the self-defined
goals of client agencies, let me now move on to consider the other
two elements in her complex mission.
B.

The Whole Government as Client

This aspect of the tri-partite role can be rendered with a sloganlike transparency.
The Attorney General must control Government litigation to insure
that Government agencies do not take inconsistent legal positions in
the Federal courts and that litigation is presented to appellate courts
with the best possible case as a vehicle.1"
Everyone readily agrees that the government should speak with a
single voice on matters that cut across concerns of all agencies. Easy
examples are policies of disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, or positions taken in litigation on the interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The hard cases are the ones in
which agencies are in conflict over issues in which each has authority
and expertise, or in which Justice lawyers disagree with an administrative body (often purporting to speak for Congress) on the interpretation or constitutionality of a statute. Even, or especially, with
hard cases, one of the major responsibilities of the Justice Department lawyer is to resolve such disputes. In my view, whenever the
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Id at 498-502.
13. Id. at 146-47 (prepared answers in the testimony of AAG Rex Lee).
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United States appears before any court without a unified government position there has been some lawyer failure.
This is partly a matter of the government lawyer's duty to the
courts. Courts assume that when a lawyer speaks for the United
States, competing interests and conflicting policies within the government have been resolved outside the courtroom. In a sense, it is
partly in return for the successful performance of this harmonizing
role that the government traditionally enjoys preferred litigator sta14
tus in the courts.
Moreover, one of the main arguments for central litigating authority is that it assures the extra-judicial or even "quasi-judicial"
resolution of disputes within the government. 15 This is another r'eason why the Department of Justice should always attempt to resolve
conflicts rather than to display the full range of respectable arguments to the court.
In my files, I found a good example of how diffused litigating
authority can prevent the government from speaking with one voice.
Organizations representing the handicapped and senior citizens sued
the Department of Transportation to prevent a threatened elimination of porter services on Amtrak. The Civil Division was working
toward a settlement that would provide alternatives to porters to aid
travellers who needed help with their luggage when the Interstate
Commerce Commission, empowered by Congress to appear in court,
disrupted the settlement efforts by intervening to argue to the court
that they, and not the Department of Transportation, were responsible for the provision of the services in question.
The point here is not about who was right between the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Department of Transportation, but that this intra-governmental jurisdictional dispute did not
belong in court. An Interstate Commerce Commission without litigating authority would have had to settle the issue in a different
way.
C.

The Public Interest

The government lawyer has cases that raise issues beyond the
identifiable client's immediate interest and even beyond the litigation concerns of the government as a whole. These are the cases in
which legal decisions "simply cannot be separated from ideas of economic, social, or political-in the higher sense of the
14. See e.g. FED. R. Civ. P. 55 (default judgments shall not be entered against
the United States); SuP. CT. R. 36 (4) (Solicitor General may file an amicus brief
without specific leave of Court or the affected parties).
15. See infra note 21 and accompanying text discussing the term "quasijudicial."

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 23:181

word-philosophy." The words are those of Archibald Cox speaking
at the 1974 congressional hearings on legislation that would have reconstituted the Department of Justice as an "independent
6
establishment'.1
Cox was one of a remarkable group of former government lawyers to testify on the bill whose purpose was to "remove politics
from the Justice Department" and to assure that decisions were
purely legal ones. Despite the obvious distress these former Justice
lawyers felt about the effects of the Watergate scandals on the department,1 7 most of them stated strongly that it was not only impossible but unwise to remove politics/policy-making from the Department of Justice. In one form of words or another, all of the witnesses
with prior Justice experience agreed with Cox that in some cases
"the decision of what legal theory to press on a court, what interpretation of the statute to urge, what settlement . .. to adopt is just
as much dependent upon one's policy preferences as it is upon one's
judgment as to the facts and law books .. ."8
The concept that a government lawyer has a duty to the public
interest equal to his other responsibilities is an easy target: "It is
commonplace that there are as many ideas of the 'public interest' as
there are people who think about the subject.""9 But my argument
does not depend on the government lawyer's individual assessment
of the public interest in each case. Nor, on the other hand, does it
imply some transcendent hierarchy of values from which the public
interest is developed or divined.
16. Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearing on S.2803
and S.2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 202 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Hearings] (Cox
testimony).
Basically the bills provided that the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General
and Solicitor General would be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for respective six year terms. They could not be removed at the
pleasure of the President, but only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office. Other
high officials of justice, such as the Assistant Attorney Generals would be appointed
by the Attorney General without a stated term.
17.
Except, perhaps, for the presidency itself, no government institution suffered
greater dishonor from Watergate revelations than did the Justice Department.
The criminal conduct of incumbent and former Attorneys General, the early
mishandling of the Watergate investigation. . .produced a widespread perception that politics and Justice had become intolerably intertwined.
Note, Removing Politics from the Justice Department:Constitutional Problems with
InstitutionalReform, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 366 (1975) (quoted in D. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 25 (1980)).
18. 1974 Hearings, supra note 16 (testimony of Ramsey Clark, Archibald Cox,
Alan Cranston, Lloyd N. Cutler, Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Arthur J. Goldberg, Charles E.
Goodell, Nicholas deB. Katsenbach, Richard J. Kleindienst, Burke Marshall, J. Lee
Rankin, Mitchell Rogovin, Whitney North Seymour, Jr., Theodore C. Sorensen).
19. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances,
54 U. CI. L. REV. 1293, 1294-5 (1987).
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I believe that the government lawyer should take her definition
of the public interest from the presidential administration in which
sh6 serves. This sometimes means that the Attorney General should
seek guidance on overall litigation policy, or even on the handling of
a specific case, from the White House. It means also that there are
occasions when litigation policy will change with the election
returns.
The line is faint between openly assuring that government litigation reflects the administration's policies and bringing to bear covert partisan influence on Justice. Because the line had been badly
scuffed in the Watergate scandals, an issue in the next presidential
election was the role of the Justice Department. Jimmy Carter
promised an "independent" department and his Attorney General,
Griffin Bell, tried at first to implement this promise by cutting off
communication about litigation with the White House. Before very
long it became clear that cases as well as orders, memoranda, and
public statements could implicate administration policies, leading to
an attempt to re-draw the line between policy consultation and political control.
During the period of "total independence," the Civil Division
dealt with one of the few notorious cases of my tenure as Assistant
Attorney General. It provides an interesting, if somewhat negative
example of the interaction of the public interest with litigation decisions. Frank Snepp, a former CIA employee, published a book
charging high government officials with extreme negligence toward
Vietnamese employees of the CIA in the evacuation of Saigon. He
did not submit the book to the Agency to review it for matters that
might still be classified, or the release of which might endanger lives,
although his original contract of employment required that he do so.
The issue was whether to bring a civil action against Snepp.
One of the problems in suing such employees is that either their
defense, or the government's proof of damages, might reveal secrets,
even though the book itself had not. The Civil Division lawyers devised a theory to avoid this pitfall. They suggested that if we were to
sue Snepp, we should proceed on breach of contract and breach of
fiduciary duty theories with damages measured by the unjust enrichment of the wrongdoer rather than loss to the government.
Although development of the theory was excellent lawyering
and greatly reduced the government's litigation risk, I did not think
it completely answered the question of whether we should bring an
action against Snepp. Judge Bell has related in his memoirs that he
"virtually had to order the Justice Department's Civil Division to
file the suit. Its lawyers kept warning that the press would attack me
on grounds that I was eroding the First Amendment's guarantee of a
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free press."20

But my concern was less that they would attack him, or me for
that matter, than that the media and the electorate it informs and
reflects, would find this suit inconsistent with President Carter's
policies on open, honest government, on protecting whistle-blowers,
as well as on defending first amendment values. I thought that this
was the kind of case in which we should at least inform the President of the arguments against bringing suit. As I described, however,
we were in the period in which there was no communication with
the White House about cases at the Justice Department.
The case is a good example of how hard it is to define the public
interest except in terms of the current administration's policies. My
political opinion was that however we framed the Snepp case, it
would implicate and potentially undermine first amendment rights
and that this was not in the public interest. My litigator's judgment
was that the case would serve only to increase the book's sales and
publicize its message. If we did not sue, the book would soon be
gathering dust on the remainder shelves. If my own judgment of the
public interest were controlling, I would have said we should not use
the Civil Division's limited resources on this case.
The Attorney General, on the other hand, was most concerned
about the intelligence agencies; their morale was very low and they
saw the Snepp case as an important symbol of their position. His
concern was that we do for these clients what they felt they strongly
needed and could not do themselves. The President might well have
agreed. He also might not have agreed, however, and this seemed to
me a case where he should have had the chance to make the
decision.2"
Of course there are many cases, probably most cases, in which
the government's course is reasonably clear to well-trained lawyers.
These are generally the cases in which the client agency's needs and
interpretation of its statutory authority and regulations are the firm
and exclusive foundation of the government's litigation posture in
court. But for the other cases, there must be a method for identifying and weighing the varying interests -a method that affords some
satisfaction to those whose position will not be offered in court. I
20. MEMOIRS, supra note 10, at 128-29.
21. One of the problems in consulting on policy with "the White House" is the
size and variety of the President's staff, which includes non-lawyers, as well as the
Counsel to the President and his associates. How to work through these staff members to present the issues to the President, or to gain his direction without taking his
personal time is a complex issue. It arose constantly in the Conference on The President, The Attorney General and the Department of Justice, based on the Meador
paper. D. MEADOR, supra note 17. Griffin Bell also returns to the difficulties of dealing
with the White House staff and the Vice-president's staff in Chapter One, "What

Went Wrong."

MEMOIRS,

supra note 10.
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know no better method than procedural due process: notice and the
opportunity to be heard.
In the early days of the office of Attorney General, a special
internal dispute resolution function was recognized and even denominated "quasi-judicial." In an 1854 opinion, Attorney General
Cushing wrote that he was not only "a counsel giving advice to the
Government as his client, but a public officer, acting judicially,
under all the solemn responsibilities of conscience and of legal
obligation."22
A modern illustration of the importance of the due process tradition at the department is recalled by Richard Kleindienst in his
memoirs. He described his reaction to a Presidential order to him as
Deputy Attorney General -the order was to drop the anti-trust
cases against ITT. Kleindienst says he would have resigned rather
than carry out this order, essentially because it was given without
due process:
Granted, the president heads the Department of Justice, and we are
to effect his policies. But how these policies are arrived at in the first
place, and how they are thereafter changed are essential matters ...
change should be the result only of thoughtful policy discussions at
the highest level ...."
A DUE PROcEss EXAMPLE

I will conclude with an example of how internal due process can
work. On April 14, 1978, I issued guidelines to all general counsels
and United States Attorneys limiting motions for costs when the
government prevailed as a defendant in discrimination suits. Essentially, the guidelines announced that costs motions would not be
made unless the case was brought in bad faith, pursued in a harassing or vexatious manner, or was patently groundless or frivolous.
I believed that people with creditable claims would be discouraged from seeking their rights by the prospect of paying the government's costs should they fail to convince the fact-finder at trial. The
effect would be especially chilling for those whose claims involved
22. 6 Ops. Att'y Gen. 326, 344, 352 (1854) (cited and discussed in Association of
the Bar of New York, The Department of Justice As an Independent Establishment,
5 (1974)).
Professor Norman Redlich, speaking from his experience as Corporation Counsel
of New York City pointed out that an Attorney General always wears two hats, as a
lawyer and as a public official. When he wears his second hat ". . he has to recognize
that he is but one of many voices in the formulation of [public] policy. There are no
rules that one can draft which will resolve the question of who determines the policy
of the government in a lawsuit. The concentration of authority in one legal department forces the policy to be made." 1975-76 Hearings, supra note 9, at 174.
23.
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new, untested theories.2 4
My costs memorandum did not follow solely from my opinion,
however, considerable due process preceded it. First were several
months of meetings between the Civil Rights and the Civil Divisions, which culminated in a directive signed by the Attorney General. It provided that all government lawyers should take litigation
positions "supportive of and consistent with the department's
broader obligations to enforce equal opportunity laws." This order,
so simple to the eye of the layperson, is wrenching to the trained
litigator, who can no longer oppose to the utmost in a politically
defined class of cases.
Before the Attorney General's memorandum, the Civil Division
in defending suits against the government had been raising issues
and pursuing strategies opposed by the Civil Rights Division when it
sued private employees and state and local governments under Title
VII. The Attorney General's memorandum did not refer to costs
though the policy behind it cut against moving for them. The Civil
Rights Division took the position that costs should never be
awarded against plaintiffs in discrimination cases.
But I did not issue the directive solely as a follow-up to the
Attorney General's memorandum. The issue came to my attention
because a district court judge had raised doubts about awarding
costs to the government and I then discovered that the Civil Division lawyers were taking varying positions on the point. It was necessary to give some clear direction.
The Civil Rights Division reiterated its opposition to seeking
costs in all cases. But over the months since I had been Assistant
Attorney General, I met with lawyers defending Title VII suits and
also some of the defendant agency officers. As a result, I learned for
the first time of the anger and pain a charge of discrimination creates in the accused. I could understand how a person who prevailed
would want costs assessed precisely for the purpose of preventing
further charges. Thus, I was unwilling to make an absolute
rule-though for ease of dissemination and discernment absolute
rules are best.
In formulating the memorandum, I consulted other concerned
government agencies: the EEOC, the Civil Rights Commission, as
well as representatives of the United States Attorney's offices. Finally, I met also with outside groups such as the Lawyer's Committee on Civil Rights Under Law and the Legal Defense Fund.
24. I was influenced by many of the same considerations the Court found persuasive in holding that only in rare circumstances could attorney's fees be awarded to
a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
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From these consultations (and their associated memos, letters
and drafts), my short directive finally emerged and I issued it with
the peculiar pleasure of a due process enthusiast. That was the last I
heard of it until 1985, when a letter came from an attorney in a case
in which the government had moved for costs. He informed me that
for many years the Civil Division lawyers had followed my memorandum, but that on April 1, 1983 the Assistant Attorney General
had issued an order revoking it and directing instead that costs
should be sought where appropriate in civil rights cases as well as
others.2"
Between these two orders from two duly appointed chiefs of the
Civil Division, a new administration had been elected. That is
enough reason, in my view, for the change in policy. I would like to
think the second order involved as much due process in its issuance
as the first did, but even if it did not, the order probably reflects
accurately the approach of the Reagan administration to Title VII
litigation.
I picked this example not because of its great importance, or
exceptional interest, but because it shows the range of people and
institutions that needed consultation even when the general outcome, given the Attorney General's memorandum and my own
predilections, was predictable. All of the consultation about both the
Attorney General's memorandum and mine prepared the ground for
the acceptance of the order, so that it never fell into desuetude, but
required specific repeal from a new administration.
Through meetings and memoranda-internal due process-the
roles of the government lawyer are reconciled. The result of due process was a memorandum that allowed client agencies some leeway
for retaliation against egregiously careless or baseless claims, centralized the government's litigation position, served the development
of Title VII law, and expressed the equal opportunity policy of the
Carter administration.
I Of course it is impossible to accord this level of internal due
process in every case. But this much consultation is not necessary in
every case, or even in most cases. Usually the government's position
is clear enough and the multiple roles coalesce nicely around appropriate litigating postures. Also, due process actually has its own efficiencies; when some decisions are made in an area after full internal
due process, and future related matters require fewer meetings and
25. The 1983 memorandum says that the "United States like any other litigant
is entitled to recover the costs of litigation." It adds that there may be some times,
"for example when the plaintiff's financial situation at the time the litigation was
initiated, or as a result of the litigation, warrants a request for a reduction of costs or
a waiver of costs." In other words, the new memorandum creates a presumption for
moving for costs while mine created a presumption against doing it.
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memoranda.
Internal due process is the decision-mode most highly developed by the Solicitor General's office and helps shape the mystique
of that office. 2" But due process comes so naturally to lawyers that
the range of consultations described in my costs example are common throughout the department, even when not officially institutionalized as they are in the Solicitor General's office.
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CONCLUSION

Government lawyering offers the chance to do work that matters. I'm not speaking here only of work as a political appointee. In
fact, I often thought the line lawyer at justice had a better job than
either the career administrator or the assistant attorney general-as interesting as our jobs were. Although there is some stress in
representing multiple interests and seeking the meaning of many
roles, it is more engaging and more significant than most other work.
My fellow contributors to this symposiums have all written
about their respect for the government lawyer. I join in that expression and add my hope that the account we have given of our experience may affirm or inspire the purpose in readers to devote some
years of their working lives to government service.

26. KAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE (1988); Note, The Solicitor General and Intragovernmental Conflict, 76 MICH. L. REV. 324 (1977).
27. "Defending the Government" had been in the computer for several months
when the earthquake hit the Bay Area. My house on the Stanford campus is located
near a major fault, but we experienced only broken glass and fallen books; when
power returned, I not only found this essay safely stored on the hard disc but also
that I had prudently backed it up. Since I had made no claim to be dealing with

earth-shaking events, any difference in my definition of these should not change what
I wrote before.
Yet I may not be entirely the same person who dragged out her Justice files to
start this article. The earthquake has deepened my sense of the importance of work
that matters. A lawyer should spend her working life-so many hours out of such a
brief and fragile time-on things that interest her and have meaning for other people.

